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From the global perspective, China and India today represent two unique new playerspresenting an extraordinary combination of a very large GDP and still with significant poverty and pockets of unrest and a very low per capita income and living standards. This unique combination raises several questions about their becoming major drivers in international economic trends. However, in the politico-strategic sphere, their recent economic success has resulted in both seeking an expanded space in regional as well as international decision-making, something that is becoming a matter for worldwide concern.
3 Thanks, however, to their colonial and cold war legacies, their economic success had, for a long time, remained a mutually exclusive exercise thus slowing down its pace of progress and its global impact. It is only rather recently that their political initiatives at confidence-building began to expand their areas of mutual co-operation, which now remains premised on their new mantra of mutual accommodation and mutual benefit 2 . Their bilateral trade has since come to be recognised as the most reliable as also the most agreeable instrument of China-India rapprochement. Their long-term potential as trade partners, however, remains yet to be fully explored and exploited and their political equations remain yet vulnerable to their problematic legacies 3 . 4 It is in this context of their fast changing equations that this article makes an attempt to hypothesise how their bilateral trade promises to become the most potent instrument for resolving their political difficulties and facilitate progress in actualising their strategic partnership for the future. This China-India economic partnership remains an essential prerequisite for the success of their regional and global political initiatives.
The new context

5
The context of China-India bilateral trade itself-bilateral as well as regional and global -has been changing rapidly. At the bilateral level, this is self-evident in the way their rapidly growing trade partnership has provided a great boost to their ongoing political confidence-building. In the wake of their diplomatic stand-off following India's nuclear tests of May 1998, their bilateral trade was the first to bounce back to its normal pace 4 . However, this boom in their bilateral trade could not have been possible in absence of bold political initiatives yet, in recent years, it is the role of their business communities that has become far more influential in determining the tone and tenor of their political interactions. However, for both China and India, their rise to stardom is no without its share of pitfalls, puzzles and challenges. Much of the aforementioned success remains particularly true of China with India slightly behind. India's Prime Minister Manmohan Singh is seen as an architect of India's economic reforms and opening up 7 . However, even without government initiatives, several sectors in India have picked up momentum and will continue to grow helping New Delhi to catch up with Peking. For example, the number of skilled professionals from India are growing at enormous speed. They mainly work in the software industry, and Chinese enthusiasm for India ' However, this general slide was not proportionally reflected in the China-India bilateral trade though China this was perhaps one area most directly affected by India's nuclear tests (see Figure 1 ). Figure 2 ). To highlight some other strong fundamentals that promise to sustain their current trade boom, while China continues to enjoy a huge favourable balance of trade vis-à-vis most other smaller states of the South Asian region, it is only the China-India trade that has remained to be China's most balanced trade in South Asia and often the balance has been in favour of India. This clearly reflects strong mutual stakes which promise to sustain this trade boom at least in the short term (see Figure 3) . Indeed, the two seem to be becoming increasingly relaxed about their bilateral ties and are now thinking of building joint strategies towards their regional and global initiatives. No-one today talks of a China-India clash in South-East Asia where both have built flourishing engagement without any mutual friction or scepticism. While so far they have not allowed this to become a major stumbling block yet their intensifying search for energy sources abroad is lately seen as one area that could post a serious challenge for their economic engagement 12 .
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12 It is the nature of China-India bilateral trade as a confidence-building measure that must be underlined to appreciate its interface with their political relations which remains so critical for its long-term prospects. Therefore, more than being measured in terms of statistics and profits, it is the political impact of trade which remains the barometer of their economic engagement. Both sides clearly display that understanding at least in their more recent initiatives. Moreover, with the inclusion of India's trade with Hong Kong and Macao (as also India's rising trade with Taiwan, and the possibility of an eventual unification of Taiwan), Greater China has already emerged as India's largest trading partner and one of its kind. 13 Major items of export from India to China remain iron and chrome ore, plastic and linoleum, marine products, cotton yarn and fabrics, organic and inorganic chemicals, dye intermediates, bulk drugs and pharmaceuticals, construction quality wire rods, tobacco and tea, while China's exports to India include items like raw silk and silk yarn, coking coal, some types of chemicals, pulses, mercury and antimony, freshwater pearls, pig iron, newsprint and several low-technology consumer items. Gradually, many new sectors-like border trade or high-tech trade-are being also explored while information technology and infrastructure development are already emerging as major areas for co-operation.
1% in China's total foreign trade, China now accounts for over 5% of India's total foreign trade which creates substantial stakes for mutual co-operation 13 .
15 Finally, their foreign exchange reserves provide perhaps the easiest layman's indicator of their international economic standing. China's foreign exchange reserves, which stood at mere US$1.6 billion for 1978, had exceeded US$659 billion by March 2005 14 . These may not be huge figures compared to those of Japan at US$843 billion yet they are when compared to India's US$142 billion 15 . The same also remains true of their foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows where China and India are often projected as either poles apart or competing against each other. However, both have again continued to sustain growth simultaneously without any major friction. Their FDI remains perhaps the strongest mover of their foreign trade and especially in case of China it has come to be known as the main locomotive for their economic success. 17 . This, however, remains rather ambitious, especially for India. Even for China, while it is expected to continue to leapfrog, it is likely to stay at its second position and may not surpass the US for a very long time. 17 But there are indicators that FDI inflows to China (even India) will continue unhindered. For example, China today accounts for over 10% of US foreign trade destinations and China owns $167 billion of US securities issued by the Federal Government 18 . During the year 2000, the total US corporate revenue generated from China was $7.2 billion, compared to $4.6 billion from Mexico, $3.5 billion from Singapore, and $1.85 billion from Brazil 19 . Though China faced some phases when FDI had gone down yet it has gradually witnessed rise from $2.7 billion for 1984 to $62 billion by 2004, largely staying within the range of $45 to $ 60 billion on an average year 20 . -the hub of capital investment in Asia-, and that China had the added advantage of its political system, cheap labour and special incentives for foreign investors as for its armed forces which were to become major players in China's opening up experiments 25 . Also important is overseas Chinese contributions. Non-resident Indians and overseas Chinese have been distinct categories in FDI inflows into their respective homelands. Beginning only from the early 1990s, while non-resident Indians do contribute a little to India's FDI, overseas Chinese are known to present a unique example by contributing over two-thirds of the whopping inflows of FDI into China 26 .
Institutional arrangements 20 As regards an evolving overall institutional framework for their bilateral trade, the China-India Joint Working Group for the Boundary Question (JWG) remains the most generic and potent forum for all issues and sets the overall tenor of China-India relations. More specifically, the two also have a JWG for Trade and Commerce which is supported by a Joint Business Council that represents business interests, in particular of the non-state sector. They also have a JWG for Science and Technology that focuses more on research and development sectors. In operative terms, much of the norms and regulations for clearing road-blocks and evolving the new legal framework for trade are facilitated by their regular meetings. Besides, using such opportunities as Summits, many more agreements have been signed between individual Departments and Ministries from both sides 27 .
21 Among some more exciting institutional frameworks, China and India have recently launched discussions to evolve a bilateral free trade area (FTA) agreement. This indicates their desire to go beyond the World Trade Organisation framework and mutually reduce tariffs even further as also to remove non-tariff barriers 28 . Indeed, in their meeting over March 21st-22nd 2004, the senior officials from China and India had launched the first round of discussions for signing a FTA agreement and a comprehensive economic co-operation agreement in Peking. The idea was further followed up during Premier Wen Jiabao's visit to India over April 9th-12th 2005. However, unlike their government, some Chinese experts continue to have strong misgivings. To quote one well-known expert on South Asia, "Although a FTA between China and India will be hard to achieve in the short term, its significance in forming a multi-party regional free trade system is apparent, given the huge population and size of the two countries" 29 . Another Chinese expert believes that the stronger trade ties and complimentary economic structures cannot ensure the quick establishment of a FTA between the two countries" 30 . India has its own reservations and, that cheap Chinese goods are flooding Indian markets has been a source of concern among India's business community as well 31 .
Investments and joint ventures 22 In international relations, finance capital transfers have been a rather recent phenomenon compared to the trading of goods and services. But mutual investments always reflect greater mutual confidence and provide a great boost to bilateral trade, especially in the long-run. And this is especially true when it comes to China-India bilateral trade. However, as of now, the United States stands out as the largest investor, accounting for about 21% of India's total FDI inflows. Mauritius follows with a 12% share, but it is really a conduit for investors from various countries, including the United States, because of a special tax treaty with India which grants exemption from Indian taxes for Mauritius-based companies. The United Kingdom is then the third 26 The reality, however, has been changing rapidly in last few years. India's Ranabaxy pharmaceuticals and National Institute for Information Technology (NIIT), today clearly dominates China's pharmaceuticals and IT education. There have also been several other smaller and less known initiatives in IT education. India's Tata Group, one of largest conglomerates in Asia, plans to increase its investment from US$2 million to US$5 million in China's software sector and has also been in discussion about jointventure projects in other sectors like automobiles and steel 35 . China's home electrical appliance makers Guangdong province-based Konka and India's Tata Consultancy Limited (TCL) have also established joint ventures in India. China's Konka though halted its manufacturing in India due to the allegedly restrictive policies and it was reported to have deep difference with its Indian partners 36 . But again, during the June 2003 visit by Prime Minister Vajpayee, China had pledged to invest US$500 million in India's infrastructure sector 37 .
Impact of nuclear tests 27 Without doubt, India's nuclear tests of 1998 had presented the most serious acid-test for China-India trade relations. There are various ways to examine how China-India trade and commerce were affected by these tests, and how bilateral trade proved to be a major catalyst in facilitating the post-1998 official and political interactions. Prime facie, their bilateral trade had suffered a visible setback the growth rate tumbling from an average 78% during the preceding eight years to mere a 3.4% for 1998. More curious was the follow-up: China-India trade was to undergo an exponential boom these last seven years following the 1998 nuclear test (as shown in Figure 1 ). Indeed, a month-tomonth change in China-India trade for 1998 presents a most startling picture of the business sector as the first to bounce back in a matter of six months, between May and November 1998. 28 Trends in trade surplus can be another important indicator of the impact of nuclear tests on bilateral trade ties. Beginning from the early 1990s, while India had enjoyed a trade surplus during 1992, 1993 and 1996, the trade surplus was with China during 1994, 1995, 1997. In fact, according to experts, the China-India trade was known to experience fluctuations even within each year as India generally enjoyed a trade surplus during the first half of the year while in China this trend was reversed during the last few months, every time. For 1997, for example, during the first eight months of 1997, there was a trade surplus in favour of India of US$40 million. Very suddenly, China's exports experienced faster growth resulting in China having a trade surplus of US$53 million by November which dropped to US$36 million by the end of December 38 . But no such trend was seen during 1998 when the trade surplus with China reached its peak of US$110 million though this rectified itself in 1999.
29 All that we had were the symbolic cancellation of China Commodity Fair in Mumbai during August-September 1998 and China's visibly low-profile presence during New Delhi's India International Trade Fair during November 1998. This did create scepticism among businessmen on both sides. Academic exchanges were the second important sector to return to normal, not letting political polemics overshadow positive economic initiatives. In addition, when seen in the larger context of China's negative growth rates in their annual trade with Asia, even the low positive growth in Sino-Indian bilateral trade for 1998 trade inks was seen to bode very well for Sino-Indian ties 39 .
Economic versus strategic priorities
30 How much China-India bilateral trade has been unaffected by politics? Have these evolved any separation from their politico-strategic scepticism or do the two remain fatally intertwined? China-India interaction following India's nuclear tests in May 1998 again provides an ideal case for such analysis. Very briefly, it was only during the period of strong political polemics of the initial period of India's nuclear tests that saw some economic interaction being cancelled or postponed and Indian exports suffering a visible setback during the first three or four months. 31 Indeed, the growth rate of China-India trade had already started slowing down from an average of 78% for the first eight years of the 1990s, by about 30% per year during the mid-1990s. It had further slid to 5.2% for 1997. Seen against the backdrop of the East Asian financial crisis of late 1990s, China's exports had also witnessed a general decline. China's exports to its major trade partners like Japan and South Korea as also its closest ally Pakistan, sent a very positive message to India's policy-makers. 42 . Strands of possible economic competition do exist, and the chances of their bilateral trade emerging as a stimulant for an eventual political stand-off cannot be completely ruled out. This means that this second phase of their bonhomie remains as yet pretty fragile. 34 To be sure, China today aspires to match India's success as an exporter of software and Taiwan's as an exporter of hardware. If India has the advantage of language, China produces three times the number of engineers as India, and Chinese companies like Legend are proving serious competition to other brands and occupy 26% of China's market. China's nascent private sector has already emerged as the most promising and potent driving force in China's economic opening-up exercise. During 1989-1997, China's private enterprises grew in number from 90,581 to 960,726 firms, which amounts to an annual increase of 34.3%. The workforce has increased from 1.64 million to 13.49 million, an annual increase of 30.1% and their capital has increased from 8.4 billion yuan to 514 billion yuan, an increase of 67.2% 43 . None of these can be ignored as paper tigers and will provide both several new challenges and opportunities for ChinaIndia trade relations. 35 The return of Hong Kong to China has strengthened the China link of India's business community, many of whom have lived and thrived in Hong Kong for over one hundred years. Juxtaposed with China's emerging private enterprises, these new trends have provided new momentum for China-India trade relations. It is especially this economic engagement between their non-state sectors that has now begun to provide steam to the China-India political rapprochement, promising to gradually emerge as an important force in moulding the nature and magnitude of China-India trade relations. Nevertheless, given the multifaceted challenges for their economic engagement, the hope lies in the two being able to continuously innovative to strengthen and evolve their bilateral trade on the basis of mutual understanding and mutual confidence.
NOTES RÉSUMÉS
Booming bilateral trade has come to be the strongest pillar of China-India rapprochement. This has not only since overtaken the pace of political confidence-building but also has a substantial impact on their mutual perceptions. Their border trade has especially brought about a noticeable transformation in their remote and problematic border regions. This has contributed to overall tranquillity and peace in the area and has as well facilitated progress in their border negotiations. This boom in trade has also introduced new trends. The two states are no longer only recipients on foreign direct investment but have entered into a new phase of being investors, both mutually as in other regions. In this new context, the increasing deficit in the energy sector and the competition to capture new markets present major challenges to sustaining this boom in their bilateral trade.
